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JUSTICE AND ORDER: A PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION OF THE LIMITS
OF LAW
Donald H. J. Hermann III*
A demand for "law and order" is the latest manifestation of recur-
rent public concern about crime.1 Today this solution is sought as
a cure for organized and violent crime, as the remedy to social dis-
solution and as the response to social dissent.' But just as in the last
decade, when "laws" were demanded to cope with problems of dis-
crimination, poverty and social injustice,3 the proposed solution of
"law and order" misconceives the nature of "law" and fails to note its
limits. The following discussion will examine the limits of the law:
justice will be viewed as the objective of the law as it resolves the
tension between the individual case and general principles; order will
be examined as that fragile situation where individual freedom and
social cohesion are held in equilibrium.
JUSTICE ...
•.. a lawyer asked him a question to test him. "Teacher which is
the great commandment in the law?" And he said to him, "You
shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your
soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first com-
mandment. And a second is like it, you shall love your neighbor
as yourself. On these two commandments depend all the laws"
.... (Saint Matthew) 4
"You shall love your neighbor as yourself." This is the Christian
* Assistant Professor of Business, Government and Society, University of Washington.
A.B., Stanford, 1965; JMD., Columbia, 1968.
1. A survey of the literature of the last fifty years reveals that each decade produces
prominent articles about the need for strong measures to meet the contemporary crime
problem. See Kamisar, When the Cops Were Not Handcuffed, N.Y. Tms, Nov. 7, 1965,
§ 6 (magazine), at 34-35.
2. See Rocke and Gerdon, Can Morality Be Legislated, N.Y. Tmras, May 22, 1955,
§ 6 (magazine) at 10, 42, 44, 49.
3. See Packer Law and Order in the Seventies, THE NEw REPuBLc, January 10,
1970, at 12-13.
4. Matthew 22:3540.
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prescription for human justice, which is the ultimate limit of the law.5
During the last decade, the complaint was often heard that law cannot
teach morality;" but the response was quick, that law can create an
atmosphere of social justice and prevent flagrant abuses of individual
civil liberties. Nonetheless, it can safely be said that the goal of justice
is never fully achieved in law. Justice is the Platonic ideal of law,
against justice all laws must be evaluated.7 Justice is an extreme, a per-
fection. Legal rules, legislation and decisions represent compromises.
Legislation is the compromise of competing interests in a pluralistic
society. Legal decisions represent resolution of competing interests in
courtroom controversies. Yet both legislation and decisions must seek
to work justice to the extent that pluralism and adversaries will permit.
In the Nuremberg trials, it was determined that rulers bear the
responsibility for promulgating just laws, and the concomitant prin-
ciple was recognized that laws passed in contravention of "human-
itarian" principles could not be relied upon to justify acts done in
conformity with such laws.' This follows from the principle estab-
lished in the writings of Aristotle and Augustine and finally declared
by Aquinas when he wrote that "an unjust law is no law at all."9
5. Classical philosophy provides a parallel formulation in secular terms:
And now I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity, what I mean by the
just and unjust, according to my notion of them:-When anger and fear, and
pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they
do any harm or not,--I call this injustice. But when the opinion of the best, in
whatever part of human nature states or individuals may suppose them to dwell,
has dominion in the soul and orders life of every man, even if it be sometimes
mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, and the principle in individuals
which obey this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be called just ....
PLATO, LAWS, BOOK IX, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 609 (B. Jowett transl. 1937).
6. The argument that law cannot teach morality was proffered as a rationale for
opposition to laws aimed at preventing racial discrimination which had come to be
regarded as a social injustice.
7. See PLATO, TXE REPUBLIC 121 (B. Jowett transl. 1901):
You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the
foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to
which his nature was best adapted; now justice is this principle or part of it.
8. See, Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. Rav.,
593, 618 (1958). Hart cites the case of a German woman who was prosecuted after
World War II for having denounced her husband during the Nazi regime for his alleged
insulting remarks about the Fuehrer; the postwar court found the woman guilty of a
violation of the 1871 German Criminal Code, having denied her any defense under a
Nazi statute which made the husband's remarks, as well as any failure to report him,
criminal. The court held that the Nazi statute contravened humanitarian principles.
9. 28 T. AQUINAS, SummA THEOLOGIAE, 61, 129 (Blackfriers transl. 1963).
A human law has the force of law to the extent that it falls in with right reason:
as such it derives from the Eternal Law. To the extent that it falls away from right
336
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Law, it must be remembered, does not simply consist of rules in a
statute book or code. Law is the application of rules to concrete sit-
uations and the process of creating rules and enforcing them. Thus,
there are two points of contact with social phenomena at which
the goal of justice must be considered. The first is in the enactment
of the law. Is the law arbitrary or capricious? Is the rule a reason-
able regulation? Is the person, property, or transaction, which is the
subject matter of the law, rightly considered the subject matter, and
fairly dealt with? Reference to these considerations is evident in
the American colonials' cry: "No taxation without representation"-
the colonials did not consider themselves as justly subjected to taxing
regulations absent concomitant representation in the tax-legislating
body. Similarly, the Nazi race laws and American antimiscegenation
laws identified individuals and subjected them to proscriptions on the
arbitrary basis of the individual's racial origins; these laws, too, were
unjust.
The second contact point is the application of the rule or statute to
the individual concrete situation. Our concern for justice at the stage
of application is manifested in malicious prosecution laws and remedies
for false imprisonment, whereby an individual who has been unjustly
prosecuted or imprisoned may recover against those who have unjustly
used the law against him. While these statutory protections do not
insure just resolution of disputes, they do prevent blatant use of the
law by individuals or the state as a means of achieving an unjust end
when there is in fact no justifiable basis in law for recovery or prosecu-
tion. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is a
manifestation of the Aristotelian principles of justice which require
that like cases be treated in like manner. Indeed, the basic vocation
of the American court system is to resolve conflicts between parties in
reason if it is called a wicked law: as such it has the quality of an abuse of law,
rather than law. [Question 93, Article 3, Reply 2.]
This argument is about a law which inflicts an unjust grievance on its subjects;
here also it exceeds the power of command divinely granted, and in such cases a man
is not obliged to obey, if without scandal or greater damage he can resist. [Question
96, Article 4, Reply 3.].
See ARISToTLE, REO=oacA, Book 1, Chapters 14 and 15 in xi TnE WoRxs oF AIsToTL
1374-77 (W. Ross. transl. 1959). See also AUGUSTN, II TE Crr OF GOD, Book XIX,
Chapter 21, 330-333. (Marcus Dodd transl. 1948). Augustine writes: "For that which is
done by right is justly done, and what is unjustily done cannot be done by right."
Id. at 331.
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such a way as to effect as great a degree of justice as possible through
an adversary process in individual cases.
This concern with the individual case is the crux of the existentialist's
interest in the law; the existentialist argues that law originates in the
concrete singular case, not in the rules, legal concepts, and precedents
found in statutes and court decisions."° The existentialist theologian
Paul Tillich attempted to reconcile the existentialist position and the
traditional view of law as a systematic development and application of
general rules, by suggesting that law is the mediator between individual
needs of justice and the practical utility of general rules:"
Justice is expressed in principles and laws none of which can
ever reach the uniqueness of the concrete situation. Every decision
which is based on the abstract formulation of justice alone is es-
sentially and inescapably unjust. Justice can be reached only if
both the demand of the universal law and the demand of the
particular situation are accepted and made effective for the con-
crete situation.
Justice, then, is the limit of the aspirations of law. Law may not em-
body justice; but through law, man seeks justice as a Platonic ideal,
the standard against which laws must be measured. Martin Luther
King in his "Letter from Birmingham Jail," argued that law must be
evaluated in terms of commonly held principles of justice, and that the
failure of law to conform to these principles provides the occasion
and necessity for civil disobedience. Reverend King wrote:' 2
How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?
The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just
and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws.
Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.
I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is not law
at all."
This analysis is readily applicable to a law which on its face, is clearly
10. See G. CoHmq, EXIsTENTIALISM AND LEcAL SCIENCE 2 (1967).
11. P. TILLICE, LOVE, POWER AND JUSTICE 15 (1960).
12. M. L. Kawo, Letter from Birmingham Jail in WXY WE CAN'T WAn 82 (Signet
ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as KING].
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violative of commonly shared values, such as the American antimis-
cegenation laws.13 But the appropriate response is not so clear when
the injustice accrues, not from the general rule itself, but in a concrete
situation where the "abstractly" just rule is applied in an unjust man-
ner. Reverend King offered an example from his own experience to
illustrate this situation:14
Sometimes a law is just on its face and unjust on its application.
For instance, I have been arrested on a charge of parading with-
out a permit. Now, there is nothing wrong in having dn ordinance
which requires a permit for a parade. But such an ordinance be-
comes unjust when it is used to maintain segregation and to deny
citizens the First Amendment privilege of peaceful assembly and
protest. I hope you are able to see the distinction I am trying to
point out. In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law,
as would the rabid segregationist. That would lead to anarchy.
One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, and
with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an in-
dividual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and
who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to
arouse the conscience of the community over its unjustice, is in
reality expressing the highest respect for law.
The achievement of justice, both in the general rule and in the in-
dividual case, remains one of attaining conformity of law with the
fundamental values which give it legitimacy. Consideration in identify-
ing these fundamental values, while difficult, becomes all the more
compelling when an individual claims justification in acting in violation
of a law on the basis of conscience. The development of objective
criteria by which the individual can make a judgment as to the validity
of law is required if order, as a purpose of law, is to be attained without
recourse to tyrannical force.
13. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), where the court held antimiscegena-
tion laws unconstitutional arguing that: "The freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the. orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men2
14. Kum, supra note 12, at 83-84.
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... AND ORDER
1. Anarchy
you cant steal nothin from a
white man, he's already
stole it he owes
you anything you want, even his
life. All the stores will
open if you
will say the magic words. The
magic words are: Up
against the wall mother
fucker this is a stick up! (LeRoi Jones) 5
In stark contrast to Martin Luther King's submission of civil dis-
obedience as a recourse to injustice is Le Roi Jones' unqualified appeal
to anarchy. To the anarchist social injustice is deemed sufficient cause
for blind rage and self-serving violence. "Up against the wall" was the
cry of the Newark rioters,1" and of the student rioters at Columbia
University as well; 17 the slogan, taken from a poem by Le Roi Jones,
symbolizes the anarchy which prevailed in both situations.
The individual ghetto rioter strikes out with blind rage at a system
which, he perceives, enslaves him. Even if not purposely and con-
sciously, he does in fact reject that social system, and thus he becomes
an agent of anarchy himself. His perception of the blindfolded goddess
of Justice is the same as that of Langston Hughes who wrote:'
That Justice is a blind goddess
Is a thing to which we black are wise:
Her bandage hides two festering sores
That once perhaps were eyes.
In rejecting "Justice," the ghetto rioter rejects the existing laws of
society, in the hope of leveling all social institutions so that he may
begin building anew. But it is clear that this rejection of existing legal
institutions means anarchy and society without laws, if not perma-
nently, at least until the work of revolution is completed.
15. Jones, Black People, EVERGREEN REvIEW, Dec. 1967, at 49. This poem was read to
the jury by Judge Kapp at the sentencing of Jones at a New Jersey trial, for his role
in the 1967 Newark riots. Schneck, Le Roi Jones, or, Poetics and Policeman or, Trying
Heart, Bleeding Heart, RAMPARTS, July 13, 1967, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Schneck].
16. Schneck, supra note 15, at 19. See also T. HAYDEN, REBELLION IN NEWARK (1967).
17. See J. AVORN & A. CRANE, Up ArAINST THE Ivy WAL 291-297 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as AVRON].
18. L. HUGHES, I WONDER AS I WANDER, 58 (1956).
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The movement for anarchy has been perhaps most apparent in our
universities, where its black flag has been increasingly at home.19 "Up
against the wall" is shouted from classroom windows at the police,
who are the symbol of law to the citizenry, and the proclaimed enemies
of the student revolutionaries. "Up against the wall" has been scrawled
on the classroom walls of the universities which have molded the
society which is reflected in the present legal system. Here, it may be
best to let the student revolutionary state his view that anarchy is
meant to level existing laws whereupon a new order will arise. During
the 1968 Columbia disturbances, student Mark Rudd wrote to then
University President Grayson Kirk:20
If we win, we will take control of your world, your corporation,
your university, and attempt to mold a world in which we and
other people can live as human beings. Your power is directly
threatened since we will have to destroy that power before we
take over.
To Mr. Rudd, Dr. Kirk was a symbol of existing society, just as exist-
ing law is reflective of existing society. The historical school of juris-
prudence declares that law is formed by custom and reflects the
history of the state.21 The positivistic school perceives a necessary
19. See Goodman, The Black Flag of Anarchism, N.Y. Tnmrs, July 14, 1968 § 6
(magazine), at 10. "In Anarchist Theory, 'revolution' means the moment when the
structure of authority is loosed, so that free functioning can occur," (at p. 15). "To have
a shambles is not unjustifiable, on the hypothesis that total disruption is the only way
to change a totally corrupt society." Id. at 13. Applying this analysis to the Columbia
protests, Goodman observed: "The protesting students are anarchists because they are in
a historical situation in which anarchism is their only possible response.... Since they
are willing to let the Systems fall apart, they are not moved by appeals to law and order
... they do not trust the due process of admininstrators and are quick to resort to direct
action and civil disobedience." Id. at 13. Then with approval, Goodman concludes that
this anarchy constitutes a return to a primitive state in which law was not needed:
".. . the Columbia action was also a model of Anarchism. ... For a while, until the
police came back, the atmosphere on the campus was pastoral. Id. at 15. See also, P.
SEALE & M. McCoNVILE, RED FLAG BLAcK FLAG: FRENCu REvoLuTION 1968, (Ballantine
ed., 1968).
20. Letter from Mark Rudd to Grayson Kirk, April 22, 1968, in Kirk, A Message to
Alumni, Parents and Other Friends of Columbia, July 1, 1968, reprinted in AvoRN,
supra, note 17, at 25-27.
21. Savigny argues that:
In the earliest times to which authentic history extends, the law will be found to
have already attained a fixed character, peculiar to the people like their language,
manner and constitution. Nay, these phenomena have no separate existence, but they
are but the particular faculties and tendencies of an individual people, inseparably
united in nature and only wearing the semblance of distinct attributes to our view.
That which binds them into one whole is the common conviction of the people.
Savigny, Von Beruf unserer Zeit zur Gesetzebung und zur Rechtsurssenschaft in W.
FRmAwx, LEGAL Tn moa 210 (1967).
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relation between the law and the shared values of a society. Thus, Mr.
Justice Holmes suggests that the law is nothing more than "the
prophecies of what courts will do in fact;" 2 judges do mirror the
existing social order and reflect existing power distributions.
Just as judicial decisions are grounded in socially shared values, the
lawyer, too, is an agent of the popular consciousness. Thus law is in-
tegrally related to the history of the state, and reflects the values of
the society at each particular moment in history. Law grows with the
history of the nation; to alter that course, the anarchist must first
destroy that nation as it exists, and then create a new social order and
a new legal order reflective of the new social system. But in the first
instance, anarchy necessarily means destruction and no law.
The ghetto and student rioters are agents and advocates of this ab-
sence of law. This is the lower limit of law for as we approach anarchy
we forsake enforcement, authority and the sovereign-all of which
are essential to society with law, and which are negated by anarchy.23
The language used by these anarchists-"Up against the wall, etc ......
-reduces those of position and authority to the lowest rank, and
portrays their total rejection by the rioters.
It is important to distinguish the actions of ghetto rioters and
student revolutionaries who reject the existing system and work out-
side the legal order, from those of Dr. King's persuasion who advocate
"civil disobedience." Abe Fortas, former Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court has drawn this distinction:
24
Civil disobedience, even in its broadest sense, does not apply
to efforts to overthrow the government or to seize control of areas
or parts of it by force, or by the use of violence to compel the
government to grant a measure of autonomy to part of its popula-
tion. These are programs of revolution. They are not in the same
category of reformers who-like Martin Luther King-seek
changes within the established order.
Reflecting on Benjamin Cardozo's observation that "law is restraint
22. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897).
23. See J. A-usTiN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRDENCE DETER3MIEa, 11-13, (Noonday
ed. 1954).
24. A. FORTAS, CONCERNINGr DISSENT AND C= DISOBEDIENCE 59-60 (Signet ed.
1968) ('hereinafter cited as FORTAS].
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and absence of restraint is anarchy,' 2 5 Fortas attempted to define "the
rule of law" as restraint of both the ruled and the rulers: 26
The state, the courts, and the individual citizen are bound by
a set of laws which have been adopted in a prescribed manner,
and the state and the individual must accept the court's deter-
mination of what those rules are and mean in specific instances.
The citizen is governed by laws which have been passed in con-
formity with established procedures and which do not violate either
the rights guaranteed by the state's constitution or the fundamental
humanitarian principles required of all civilized states.2 7 The failure
of the state to be "bound by a set of laws," or a failure of its sovereign
edicts to conform to fundamental humanitarian principles constitutes
official oppression under the guise of "law and order."
2. Oppression
Through all the centuries force and power are the determining
factors. . . . Only force rules. Force is the first law. (Adolph
Hitler) 2
Law in National Socialist Germany served as an agency of oppres-
sion. The state was totalitarian in form, which required that legal
duties and rights be redefined with a view to the total way of life.29
Law has one purpose in the totalitarian state: to maintain the unity
of the state. The Fuhrer, as leader of the unified state was both the
source of legal purpose and the means of achieving that purpose; he
became both lawgiver and judge without any external restrictions on
his will as both the source and enforcer of law. In 1936, Dr. Hans
Frank, German Minister of Justice, attempted to apply the ideology
25. B. CAmDozo, Th PAADOXES Or LEGAL SCIENcE 94 (1928).
26. FORTAS, supra note 24, at 59.
27. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HIARv.
L. REv. 642-648 (1958). See also L. FuLLER, TnM MORALiTY op LAW (1964).
28. Address by Adolf Hitler, Essen, Germany, Nov. 22, 1936, in Hinan's WoRDs 4
(G. Prange ed. 1944).
29. See generally H. ARan=T, TEN ORIGnS Op TOTALiTARmuSm 305-479, (1966).
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of the totalitarian state as a concept determining the development of
law in National Socialist Germany:" °
It is impossible to believe that the unified will of the people is
materialized in the will of the state if at the same time it is as-
sumed that this same power of the state subdivides itself into
entirely separate competences .... There is one kind of power in
Germany today-the power of the Fuhrer. . . .In Nationalist
Socialist Third Reich it is no longer possible, as it was in the
liberalistic epochs, for the judiciary to indulge in subversive op-
position to the unified will of the state and the Fuhrer, under
the pretext of upholding the independence of the courts .... The
judges and lawyers, too, are bound by the authority of the Fuhrer.
Frank's rejection of a state "bound by a set of laws" required a theory
of government free from the restraint of law. Here is the second lower
limit of the law: oppression by the state. John Lindsay, Mayor of
New York, made this point in a speech before the 1968 National Re-
publican Convention when he said that "liberty without law is anar-
chy, but law without justice is tyranny."'"
An example of official oppression can be found in the police re-
sponse to the demonstrations in Chicago during the week of the 1968
Democratic National Convention. There, state tyranny took the form
of police brutality upon randomly selected victims, and of arbitrary
infringements of rights of free expression and assembly. The report
to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
describes the specter of this official oppression:32
The nature of the response was unrestrained and indiscriminate
police violence on many occasions, particularly at night.
That violence was made all the more shocking by the fact
that it was often inflicted upon persons who had broken no law,
disobeyed no order, made no threat. These included peaceful
demonstrators, onlookers, and large numbers of residents who
were simply passing through, or happened to live in, the areas
where confrontations were occurring.
The use of official position to attain "governmental" objectives is
30. H. Frank, Rede Au! der Schlusskundeburg des Deutschen in S. S soN & J.
STONE, LAW AND SOCIETY 1680-1681 (1949).
31. Address by John Lindsay, National Republican Convention, August 5, 1968.
32. D. WALKER, RIGHITS IN CONFLICT CHICAGO STUDY TEAm REPORT TO TuE NATIONAL
CoMILIssIoN ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE XiX (Signet ed. 1968).
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further illustrated by attempted vindictive applications of the Selective
Service Law to induct "dissidents" exercising their right of free ex-
pression against a war they consider unjust. Such punitive reclassifi-
cation exemplifies the use of an ostensibly just statutory scheme in
a manner which unjustly interferes with the principles of personal
freedom, including expression and dissent, which are fundamental in
a humanitarian societyP
Anarchy and oppression are the lower limits of the law; when they
exist, law does not. Today's frantic call for "law and order" is a cry
for oppression, to avert the threat of anarchy posed by revolutionaries
and rampant crime. It would indeed be terrifying if the only choice
was the vicious terror of crime and the random terror of anarchy or
the official terror of state-oppression. The simplistic solution of "law
and order"-a call for greater use of naked force to restore domestic
order-must be rejected, because the "order" sought thereby is a
tyranny which is necessarily reprehensible to civilized society.
The future of a democratic society can best be assured by develop-
ment and definition of those freedoms which are fundamental in a
humanitarian society. The American constitutional system of protec-
tion and procedures is intended to provide a workable matrix for
creative evolution of such fundamental freedoms, while resolving the
conflicting demands of individual justice and general social order.
If current demands for "law and order" result in fewer restraints
on police conduct, destruction of the presumption of innocence, and
33. See Gutknecht v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 506, 511-512 (1970) where the Court
held that accelerated induction was an abuse of local board discretion. The Court noted
the following statement by Selective Service Director Hersey:
The escalation of the United States military involvement in Vietnam increased the
draft calls, and there was an upsurge of public demonstrations in protest. Some of
these protests took the form of turning "draft" cards in to various public officials
•. these registrants were not prosecuted] but were processed administratively by
the local boards. In many instances, the local boards determined that a deferment
of such registrant was no longer in the national interest, and he was reclassified....
Id. at 511-512 n.7. In reviewing this procedure the Court observed: "Where the
liberties of the citizen are involved, we said that 'we will construe narrowly all delegated
powers that curtail them."' Id. at 511. In examining the powers delegated to the local
board, the Court concluded:
[T]here is no suggestion that as respects other types of discrimination the Selective
Service has free-wheeling authority to ride herd on the registrants using immediate
induction as a disciplinary or vindictive measure.
Id. at 511. See also Breen v. Selective Service Board, - U.S. -, 24 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1970)
holding punitive reclassification to be an abuse of delegated powers; Note, Draft Reclass-
ification for Political Demonstrations, 53 Coanar_ L. Rav. 916 (1968).
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erosion of other procedural protections, and we then find that order
has still not been attained, we will hear increasingly frantic calls for
repression until all of our fundamental legal rights have been abro-
gated. The unchecked will of the sovereign then will be supreme, and
we will face the situation which Thomas More feared in A Man For
All Seasons: 4
What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get
after the Devil? .... And when the last law was down, and the
Devil turned round on you-where would you hide.... the laws
all being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast
to coast-man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down-
and your're just the man to do it-d'you really think you could
stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give
the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.
Oppression can be the declared policy of the state; for example,
the enacted laws of National Socialist Germany imprisoned on the
basis of race, and punished all criticism of the Fuhrer. But this ele-
ment of repression may be even more sinister when it consists in
disparity between official conduct and the declared rule, such as when
statutes promise protection to the individual but the official conduct
of the state violates his rights, and that violation remains exempt from
correction despite the protecting laws. When this occurs, we have a
condition quite the opposite of law measured by the standards of jus-
tice; we do have a state arrayed with the appearance of legality; but
it is not a state bound by law, not a state compelled to accept the
court's determination of the meaning and force of laws. This we en-
countered in Nazi Germany, and it is the danger facing America
today.
34. R. BOLT, A MA2 FOR ALL SEASOwS, 38 (Vintage ed. 1962).
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